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S H i C^ TJ H I I I 



TO 



ilENERAL M'CALL'S REPORT 



OF THE 



PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES IN THE PENINSULA. 



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V 




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Sequel to GeiieralU'Call's Report 

OF THE 

PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES IN THE PENINSULA. 






T reirrot estremely that justics to myselt and to my 
di\^SIOIl shoj'd render any iiirther comment ot mine 
on the ofEcial statemoiits oi Ueueral McClellan, in 
his report ol the Peiiinsula Campaisu, at fill neces- 
sary. But havinj,- been i romoved in seii-doionse to 
publ.sh my own report, immcd atolv on observing in 
a daily joun.al an extract from that officei's report 
reflectiaa: on my tiivisioa, published in advance of 
the oC.cial document pnnted by order of CoDsrres?, 
and haviuff subsequently discovered m the la ter nir- 
thcr statements iuiurious to myself and my cod> 
mand. I was led to open a correspondence vv'itn seve- 
ral Genera officers who served in that campalpn. 
This correspondence has but recently closed. It hcs 
brought to lis:ht some interesting tacts, and I ave 
taken the earliest le.sure I could devote to the ma:- 
tcr to lay these developments before my countrymen. 
Tte services ot my division have been either mis'u- 
terpieted or miiund! rs^qod,■ and consequent misre- 
prcscurations, as discreditable to the author as unjust 
to mi'seli, have Lecu issued to the world in every 
toim of publication by the hundred thousand copies. 
It is an uniiJeasant task to revert to this subject, lor 
bclore the war I had enteriained no other lee^intrs 
than (hose ot amity lor General McClellan, and 
coufldence in his ability ana iutegrivy. When, how- 
ever, asseitions are made which in my jud,'rn;ent are 
unsupported by tacts, it becomes my dut. to "rectify 
the lecord." I now iiroceed :— General McClellan, 
in his ofiicia! report (House Eeji. Ex. Doc, No. 15, 
page 137), quotes from and indorses Genera' Heiht- 
zi LMAs's report, wnh res] ect to the operations of 
my division in the battle ol Kelson's iarm, Glendale 
or ICew Market Cross Heads, as var ouslv- called, 
rather Ircely, considering that Heij.tzelman Vias 
all the time in my rear, separated by a strip of pine 
lorest from my battle-:ncurd, where he cou'd, from 
personal observation, know absolutely uothin? of 
what was passing in my division. 

One of these quotations is the fol'.ovring: — "Gene- 
ral Heistzelm ax states that about five o'clock P. 
BI. General I'IcCall's Divi ion was attacked in 
larce force, Pvidently the principal attack; that in 
less than an hour the diviion gave way . " 

In order to expose the error here promulgated it is 
only neccssaiy to cile Gci eral McClellan himself. 
On the same page an« the .o;io\v;n?> one of his Ee- 
port (p. 137-8), he makes this statement:— 'Gen' ral 
ScMXEEsaysci this battle, 'Ihe battle ot Glendale 
was the most severe r.ction siiice the battle ot Fair 
Oaks. About 3 (three) o'clock F. M. the act:oii com. 
menced. a:-d aiter a lurioas contest, 'asling til! aitcM 
dark, the enemy v, as routed at all p„iuts and driven 
from the field.' " 



Now it is known beyond the possibility of a cavil 
that my division wasengap-ed T\ith ihe enemy, single 
haLded, for two hours telore either Sumker or 
Hooker saw the enemy at all, font was not until 
about S (five) P- M. when Setmouk's Brigade of ir.y 
division was lorccd back on .Sdmnee's right and par- 
tially on Iiookee, that the commands Ol either oi 
these officers became engaged. That thes: troops 
received the shock handsomely no one has denied, 
though General Sumner told me in Washmjton 
aiDout the early part of November, 1862, that he be- 
lieved Genc-al Hooker s Division wou d have been 
driven in by the impetuosity of the enemy, had he 
not sect the best reciment o. his corps (Col. Owe>, 
! Sis.ty-ninth Penn'sylvania Volunteers) to the support 
I ol that General, 'ihls en passant. But what makes 
' the official reiJ.Tt of General HEI^■TZELI1AN apnear 
a little sin /ular is the tact that General Hooker, who 
commanded a divir^ion of Heintzelman's Corps, in 
his official report to Heintzelman himself, makes 
this statement: — "About three o'clock the enemy 
commenced a vl.crorous attaciv on McCall." (See 
Kelclliou Record, vol. 5, p. 260.) Thus, loth Stjmneb 
and Hooker being in my immediate vicinity, and 
their unasked tes;imony as to the hour at which my 
division was attacked aTceiug with my own official 
reporl, it is rendered patent that my division was at. 
tacked at three o'clock P. M., and not at five o'clock 
P. M.. as reported by General McClellan. 

With respect to my d, vision having given away in 
less than an hour, I need only say that, as the testi- 
mony 01 every officer commanding a regiment and 
many others oi the division provin ■■ the assertion to 
be uniounded, has been published heretofore in my 
report. 1 shall now only refer to the irank and manly 
testimony ot Cer.erai 3Ieade, in a letter to me, 
dated Camp Warrenton, "Va., Nov. 7, 1862:— 

" # * * * It -was only ihe stubborn resistance 
offered by our division (the Pennsylvania Reserves;, 
prolonciing the contest till alter dark, and checkinsr 
till that time the advance ot the enemy that enabled 
the concentration dunng the nisrht of the whole 
army on James iiiver, which saved it." (See pnnted 
report.) 

It is thus rendered equally patent that my division 
did not give v»'ay in less than an hour, but fought 
til! night put an end to the battle. 

Ihe loiviroiug are my prrounds lor declaring the 
atoicsaid p:;ssage in General McCLELLAii'a re;;ort 
to be not in accordance icith facts. 

There is another passage in General McClellan'S 
report, the oiiO immediately i receding that just dis- 
cussed, '.n which he makes it appear that "my Divi- 
sion was re'uctantiy compelled to give way belore 



[ 2 ] 



heavier force accumu'ated upon rhc.n," and quotes 
my report. Wheclicr my nport was m'squoled or 
miscoi iod I cannot pretend to say; but I certa'.n'v 
did not intend to convey that idea. What I did 
mean to cor.vcy is this: — i hat the two repriments 
(Fourth and Seventh) ot Meade's Bri^rade, in sup- 
port ot Randall's battery "were reluctantly com- 
pelled to {nve way tefoie lieavie ■ lorce accumu- 
lated upon them." Ann tliia will appoar to every 
impartial reader when he reads in the n"xt sente: ce 
oi my report ti.ese emphatic words : - "The centre of 
my division was still encased," * * Tins sen- 
tence {general JIcClellah ignores and omits, a;.d 
ot course the impression intended to be leit on the 
public mind is ihat I had stated in my report that 
my Licision was compelled to give wa j. This w:.s 
not my intention, certainly. The truth is, when 
Uaxdall's battery, on the ri,"ht of the divis.on, 
was capUired in my i resence. I rode to the centre 
01 the division in order to brir.g up a sufficient lorce 
to recover the battery which stil lay upon its own 
eround, seme ol the suns overturned ai;d sur- 
rounded bv tony odd dead horses; hut I found the 
centre so hotiv engacced as to demand all my alteu- 
tlon and sobcilude until the attack at that point 
shou'd be reije led, which in a short time I had the 
satislatjtion to witness, with the capture ot the s'an- 
dard oi the Tenth Alabama. In the meantime Eaiv- 
dall's Battery was recaptured by Lieu:, nant-Co- 
lonel BoLLiNGEn, of the Seventh, "alter one oi the 
guns had been turned upon him and its contents 
tired into his rauts." (S"e :.is (Bollinger's) testi- 
monv in my printed report.) And 1 uow assert that 
the division was not compelled to give way, as stated 
by General McClellak. 

0:1 the same ):a- e witli the toreaoinar (137) General 
JIcC'LELLAN states: — "General JIC'all's troops 
" soon bcran to emer^ie irom the wood- into the open 
" liild. Several battenes were m position and beiraii 
" to fire into the woods over the heads ot our own 
" men in Iront. Captain De Kussy's Battery was 
" placed on the light of General Sumnek's artillery, 
" with orders to shell ihe woods." 

It IS necessary, in order that the foregoing state- 
ment may be understood, to explain to the reader 
that it is a quotation from General Heixtzelman's 
report (Heiatzelmak himself Lavinj? "placed De 
EtrssY's battery), and reiers to a,-\ earlier part of the 
action, when Seymour's Brigade oi my division fed 
back on Sitmner, and before EA^DALL's Battery 
was attacked. Indeed, J^IcGlellan's report ol tins 
battle IS rather olscvre and uninlelli.prib'e to one not 
present, but tl c reader is recommended to conipare 
the above trom McClellan's Report, page 137, 
with Hli^tzelman's report m tha "Companion 
Vol. Rebellion Record, page 276." 

The his^tory ot this affair is as follows :— When 
Seymour's brigade was driven in, the gt eater part 
were leioimod by their Colonels m rear ol their own 
grrouna; the lesser part lell backon Genera;s Sumner 
and llcoKER, carrying with them some two (200) 
huLdrt'd prisoners just taken by (hem. On the 
sirength ot this display ot retiring loices, Genoial 
Hooker reponed officially that MoCall's "whole 
division was completely routed, &c." On the same 
data, Gereral Sumner told me in Washinirton, early 
in Kovember, 1862, "I saw your men coming out oi 
the woods; but in a lew moments I saw they were 
strasgltTs, and I thought no mon- about it." Sum- 
^EE was a brave and 1 onorabie man; and he would 
have scorned to say more or less than the truth. 
Peace to his ashes, in the name of God, amen! 

In reierenco to this stase of the battle, when the 
enemy, lollowiug the leit portion ot Seymour's 



men, fell upon Sumner and Hooker, the latter 
states in his report that he "rolled the enemy back, 
and passng S^tmneu's iront, they were by him hur- 
riedly thrown ove- on to Kearney." The ?ailant 
General might have said, witiiout much stretch of 
the hypeibole, that the enemy was "hurriedly 
thrown over the moon!" the one being qmte as 
practicable as the othei', Kearney beuiff on my 
right, halt a mile trom Hooker (who was on my 
leit). and six ol my re.-fiments and three battenes. 
Cooper's, Kerns' and Randall's, in the interval 
hotly contest ng the ground with part of Long- 
TTREET's Divis:ou, whic'i, I am proud to say, aiter 
hard fl.o-h tin w, recoiled before the Pennsylvania Re- 
serves. The simple tact is, the enomv was thrown 
over bv Sumner (for the meeting with Sumner and 
Hooker was aito.,'ether unexpected by the enemy, 
and they were disordered by their rencontre with 
Seymour) on to my centre, as established by the 
testimony of Colonel Roy Stone heretolore given; 
and repulsed as I have just stateJ. 

In a letter to me, dated Columbus, Ohio, February 
14, 1834, m reply to inqiuries ot mine. General 
Heinttzelman says, "about five o'clock it was re- 
ported to me that the Fe^n^<yJvanIa Reserves had 
iriven way. Knowing that it the enemy made much 
piogre s in that direction Kearney's Division and 
the troops on the right o; him (Slocum's Division, 
&c.) would be cut off .rem the rest ol the army and 
trom our ime of retreat to the James Rivev, I rode 
lorward." Here is good presumptive proof that 
the "stubborn resistance" of the Keservcs pre- 
vented McClellan's Army beiuor cut in two. 
HEiNTZELMAN'g temporary head-quarters were 
ai; the crossing of Charles City road, about six 
hundred yard.^ in my rear. On reaching the lurther 
edge of the pine woods, in my rear, and seeing mv 
men ' emeiging irom the woods" and Sumner pre- 
paring to res.st the advance ot the enemy he directed 
his chiel 01 artillery to shell the woods in his iiont 
(in my rear), and his letter then ;:oes on, "I stopped, 
myseli, at, 1 suppose, ha'f way across the op^n space 
(on hisieiarnto his head-quarters) to take auDther 
look to be satisfied that the enemy wou d be checked 
or diiven back. (Wiiero was my division at this 
time?) \\ hilst halting here I was struck on the 
aim bv a ball from one oi the enemy's sharp-shooters, 
I presume, in the woods in front; also one ci my 
staff was hit." 

11 ow the sharp-shooters got into the woods, in 
the rear ot the Peuns\lvania Reserves, and 
in part, at that time, occupied by two regi- 
ments of my reserve brigade, it is difficult to see; 
but as it appears, from his own report, that these 
wounds were contusions from .spent ba.Js, it is pre- 
sumable that the shots were fired over the heads of 
my men when enga,<?ed at close quaiters with the 
enemy in front oi these woods. 

In order to explain to the reader what was going 
on in m\ dnisioi; at this tin.e, I extract a jassa.Te 
from my le;ter to General Heintzelman, dated 
March 29, 1864:— ">'ow, my dear Geiieial, had vou, 
attcr , osting De Ru?SY's Battery, ridden through 
the V arrow strip or woods in .ront o; you, a little to 
the nsht of where you saw my men 'emerging from 
the woods,' you would have founa mo in the open 
field ill front, with the centre of my division; and 
iieneial Meade, with his briirade, on the riglit of 
the division; and six regiments of the reunsylvania 
Reserves and three battenes, at that very moment 
blazing awav at the enemy, who was advancing 
with great steadiness to cio>e quarters, but was 
driven bade with great slaughter from every point 
of luy right and centic. Before you started to re- 



[ 3 ] 



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turn, you placed De Eussy's Battery on the riglit 
of SuiiMER's ArtiileiT) with oidars to shall tue 
woods in your front. Soon alter this shelhnsj com- 
menced, General Meade rode vip to me and re- 
ported that 'the shells Irom those batrenes were lall- 
ina: amon„' his men,' and requested mo to cause 
them to cease flrin,"'. 1 immediately seut my Aid- 
de-camp, Captain ScHEETZ, to state the fact to the 
officer commanding the baitery, and request him to 
cease flriup-, as my troops were in his Irout. In the 
meantime s! ells be?an to fall about the centre ot 
my division ; there is no mistake a' out this, as 
some ot them exploded over my own head. Cap- 
tain SCHEETZ returned acd reported tliat he had 
delivered my messaore, but that the officer com- 
manding the artillery refused to stop firins without 
orders 1 10 LO his own General. I then directed hi n 
to seelt' the (Tonei al commanding the troops and re- 
peat my request. The horse oi my Aid vias killed 
on the way, and he did not fina the General. The 
filing, however, ceased not long afterwards, the 
enemy havius; been repulsed bv me." It will be 
seen by the lorefoing extract that, while I was 
steadily resisting a heavy pressure from the enemy 
m Ironi, I was subjecled to "a fire in the rear" irom 
my inends. 

I trust that this plain and unvarnished explana- 
tion ot the rather crude passage in General McClel- 
lAN's reiiort, above quoted, will be sulDciently in- 
telligible to the public and all concerned. Kefer- 
ence may at auy time be made to Geueral Meade 
and the otiicers oi botli his and my own staff'. 

I must still reler to another passage in General 
McClellan's rejiort. On the same pa?e (137), he 
says : — "Late n the day, at the call ot General Keae- 
NET, General Taylor's First New Jersey Bri^-ade, 
Slocum's Division, was sent to occupy a portion ot 
General McCall's deserted position, a ba'terv ac- 
companying the brifl-ade. They soon drove back the 
enemy, who shortly alter p-ave up the attack." Had 
this been true, it would have been the most ungene- 
rous and unn.ateful expression— the deserted posi- 
tion!— ever used by a commanding General towards 
a general oflicer, who had fought his division tor 
four hours, against superior numbers, even it over- 
come. But the check given to Lee by my division 
ou the Kew Market load, havmar, m the judgment 
01 more than one Federal, and at least one Coniede- 
rate Gene.a , "saved McGLELLAN'sarmy," it makes 
the sti?-ma attempted to be cast on the division the 
more claiing and unpardonable. 

I have Within a short time been unofficially in- 
formed that General McClellan, desirous ot 
smoothing over the unmannered epithet, has writ- 
ten to the Adjutant-General at Washington, request- 
ing leave to ciianae his phraseology to the lollovnng. 
viz:— "A portion ot General McCall's position, 
from which he had been driven by tsuperior num- 
bers." 

Previousl_\- to this, however, I had, on receiving 
the official copy of General McClellan's report, 
written to General Heintzelman, to ask whether 
this term "deserted," had also been derived irom his 
report. Heintzelman disclaimed the authorship, 
and sent me a pnnted copy of his report oi the bat- 
tle. 

In this report he says: — "Seeing that the enemy 
were g'.vine way (tliis refers to their sudden repulse 
by Sumner and Hooker, upon whom they unex- 
pectedly came while following Seymour) I returned 
lo the forks ol the (Charles City) road, where laterin 
the day I received a cail from General Kearney lor 
aid. Knowing that all General Sedo wick's troops 
were unavailable, I was gladto avail myse if of the kind 



off'3rot General Sloottm to send the New Jersey Bri- 
gade ot his d; vision to General Kearney's aid I rode 
out iar enough on the Charles City road to see that we 
had nothing to fenr from that direction and re- 
turned (o see the New Jersey Bri?.icie en' er tho 
woods to General Kearney's relief. A battery ac- 
companied this brigade. They soou drove back the 
enemy. It was now growing dark." On comparing 
Hei~ zelman's statement just given with that of 
iilcCLKLLAN srivou abovo, it is evident that the latter 
is a transcript ot the lonner, in part. I woula that I 
might, tor General McClellan's credit, say a 
transcript; entire and correct. But I am constrained 
to say that it is incomprehensitile how General Mo- 
C'LELLAN could havp happened to suLstitiite General 
Mc'''ALL's position for General Kearney's position. 

Having written to General Heintzelman on this 
subject, he replied to me in a letter dated ( olur.ibus, 
Ohio, March 24, 1864 as lollows: — "I had some dis- 
cussion with Ceneral Kearney, some time alter, he 
saying that; he never asked lor rein orccments, 
thou^rh when I recalled what had occurred, he ac- 
knowledged tliat the message he had ssnt virtually 
amounted to that. \\'hetht'r Kearney's Division, 
or auy part, was driven back, or ii so, how far, I 
cannot now remember." From the foregoing it is seen 
that the Fiist New Jersey Brii^ade, under Geueral 
Taylor (Kearney's old Brigade) was oifered by 
Slocum .or Kearney's support, and reported by 
Heintzelman to have entered the woods to Kear- 
ney's reiiet, under his own eye, it is thereiore in- 
controvertible that General McClellan's report in 
this connection is not m acconianoe with facta. 

There is stili one more remark ot General Mc- 
Clellan's that requires my notice. In his letter to 
the Piesideut, dated ''Harnso.'s Bar, .tames River, 
July 4, 18j2" (his report, page 142), he asserts, " We 
have lost no guns, exceot twenty-five ou the field of 
battle, tweniy-one ot which were lost by the giving 
way ot McCall's Division under the onset of supe- 
rior uumi ers." 

The General should have been a little more careful 
what he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, or perhaps a little 
more cautious what he published. By turning to 
pase 127 ot his report, it will be seen that m the 
account of the ba.tle ol Gaines' Mills he makes 
this statement: — " The number ot «runs captm-od by 
the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three 
01 which were lost by being run off" the bridge 
dunnff the final withdrawal." 

The number ot guns, then, lost by McClellan in 
this bat'le was nineteen. Soon alter I read the letter 
to Mr. Lincoln above quoted, I wrote to iieneral 
Wm. F. Barry, General McClellan'* Chief of 
Artiilcry during tho Peninsular campai.en, request- 
ing him 10 refer to his reports and to luiorm me bow 
many euns he had reported lost by my division at 
Gaines' JiiUs, and receive;' the lollowing reply. 

Washington, March 10, 1864. 
ily Dear General:— Your note ot Tihinst. i>! just 
received, and finds me on the eve ot departure lor 
the southwest, whither I am Otcered lor duty 'vith 
Grneral (jEant's armies. I regret extremoly that 
my papers reiatimr to the Peninsular campais'n are 
all packed up, and have I ecn sent away, acd that 
I have no better reierence than my memory to enable 
me to answer your queries. I can, however, siate in 
general terms thati tiie i>uns lost by field iiaiteries bc- 
lono-iuff to your division tvere biU a very small por- 
tion 01 the %. ole number lost at Gaines' Mil ?. * * 
Faithiuily yours, ^\ illiam F. Barry. 

With respect to the guns lost at Nelson's tarm or 
New Marki t cross roads, it is a tact well known that 
alter IJandall's Battery was taken by tho enemy 
and retaKcn h\ the Reserves (see Colonei Bollin- 
ger's report), tho guns could not be removed 



i 



LLIN- A 

d for Aa 

A 



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want of horses, forty odd oi those belonjrinjj to the 
battery iyiuff dead on the ground; and 1 am autho- 
rized to say that Kasdall applied to General 
Heintzelman, axter i.i >litlall, lor men to drajr ins 
guns off fh? croiind, tut was reliised by that ofljcer 
01! the plea that "it w ouid brin? on a renewal ot the 
battie." For instance. General ."iIeade says to me 
in a letter dated Head-quarters, Army of the Poto- 
mac, March 2, 1Sj4: — "1 iiavc always mainamedthat 
these euns (R^'.i.dall's lialtery) were not lost by 
the division, but were abandoned bv the army. 

"It IS notorious that t'ey remained all niaht in their 
ori'.inal position on the Sold. out«ido the line of the 
enemy's pic! ets, the enemy having withdrawn Irom 
the field alter dark, and not returnins till ei?ht 
o'clock the next day, when their skirmishers ad- 
vanced ill order of battle, and finding these euns, 
took |iofsession of them. I haye this from Ran- 
dall, who, bein? aware of it at tiie time, applied to 
Keaenet, and, I ihink, to Heixtzelman, for au- 
thority and men to drag his guns off, but was refused 
on the iirouud it would bring on a renewal of the 
battle, and at one o'clock the division with the army 
moved on to Malvern Hill. When I say I had it 
ironi KA^DALL, I mean the lact that the enemy did 
not take possi ssiou of tbem (tlio guns) the evening 
ot the battle, but lell back and left them for us to 
drag off it we chose. The lact that they took pos- 
session ot them tiie next morning, about eiffht 
o'clock, I got from Dr. Collins, Third Sediment, 
P. E. C, who remained with the wounded, and 
saw the advance oi the enemy the next day," [ 
Aeain, Mr. J. K. Syphee, of Lancaster, some time j 
since \ntii the Army of the Potomac, state" that i 
he was tol 1 by Randall hiuiself that "he had ap- j 
plied to General Heintzelman ior men to drag off 
bis auns, and was relused," on the grounds stated 
by General JIeade in ihe toregoing letter. 

Now liere is satistactory testimony that these 
guns lay on the outside ot the enemy's lines, and 
were seen there long alter sunrise the loUowing 
morning by Suraeon James Collins, of the Third 
Regiment Pennsilvania Reserves (Meade's Bri- 
gade), and by many others who remained to care 
lor our wounded (as since reported to me), and were 
not in possession 01 the enemy until, by the retreat 
otJIcC'LELLAN's army, they fdl, uncared for, into 
the hands of the enemy. It must also be remembered 
tba*^ at this time Col. S. G. Sijimons, commanding 
the First Brigade ot the Reserves, was mortally 
wounded, General G. G. Meade, commanding the 
Second Brigade, was severely wounded and com- 
pelled to leave the field, and General T. Seymour, 
oonimanding Third Brigade, was not to be found : 
while I, myself, about dark, while moving tor- 
ward at the head of about five hindred men, under 
the command oi Lieut. Col. Thompson, of tbe 3rd 
Redmeut, and being som3 distance in advance oi him, 
with ihe purpose of :e;oyering this same battery, 
had been made prisoier;— rememliering this, 1 say, 
it will be seen that Gtne-als Kearney and Heint- 
zelman were the jjropcr officers to whom Randall 
should have applied for the means to save his guns, 
which could without loss have been done after the 
enemy had retired. I thereiore do not hesitate to 
assert that the six guns ot RA^DALL's Battery were 
shavi:etul!y abandoned by McClellan's urmy— not 
lost by me. As regards the German battery 
left behind, by whose autborily I know not, 
and lound on my ground by me, and unfor- 
tunately, as it turned out, assigned by me, 
in consequence ot finding it there, a position 
in my line ot battle, its guns could not have been 
included in the twenty-one reported by 31cClellan 



lost by my division giving way under the onset 
of svper;or numbers, lor the best of reasons, viz., 
they did not,awa.t the onset, but inglouously fled 
with their limbers, leaving their guns behind, and 
ran over and trampled my men (lour companies 
Fuurtli Re/imcut), placed in their rear for their sup- 
port and proteciion. Colonel Roy Stone, com- 
manding the Bucktails (First Regiment Reserves), 
stating 111 his report to me, " This advance of the 
enemy" (when Seymour was driven in), "might 
have been checked by the Dutch battery belonging 
to Porter's corps, and temporarily with your divi- 
sion that day, but it was deserted by its (junners on 
the first appearance ot the enemy." Some ot these 
guns, however, were saved, and brought off. In re- 
ferring lo this incident ot the battle, I Lave not in- 
tended to speak siightinffly, although the whole affair 
in that connection was ratiior ludicrous. 

To sum up, I think I may say I have established 
the lollowing points: — 

1st, That my division was attacked at 3 o'clock, 
P. M., June 30th (battle or' Nelson's Farm, or New 
Market cross roads), not at 5 o'clock, as stated by 
General McClellan, 

2d. That it did not give way in less than an bou7, 
as stated by General McClellan, but fought till 
nightiail (about lour hours), with what result let the 
j country judge. 

I 3d. That the Now Jersey Brigade was not sent to 
occupv a portion oi my deserted position, as stated 
by General McClellan, but was sent to the re ief 
ot General Kearney, who had called lor aid. 

4th. That General McClellan's report to Presi- 
dent Lincoln, that "he had lost but twenty-five 
guns on the field ot battle, twenty-one ot which 
were lost by McCall's Division giving way under 
the onset of superior numbers," is not in accord- 
ance with facts. 

Tiie statements I have made in the toregoing pages 
are the record, m parr, oi the operations oi my divi- 
sion in the battle of Nelson's Farm, or Newmarket 
Cross-Roads, well known either to General Meade 
or to the co'onels of re?iments and other ofliceis of 
the division, and can be proved beiore any mLitary 
tribunal in the country. 

On the 28th September, 1864, I sent to General 
McClellan a copy ot a letter written to a friend of 
mine, which letter was in substance and almost in 
language identical with the foregoing statement in 
full. This I did, wishing to afford him an opportu- 
nity to correct errors in his official report reflecting 
upon my division and myseit, if arising from hastily 
examined reports ot his subordinates, and as hastily 
written and published in his own. 

1 his I should have done at an earlier date had all 
th? materials I desired to collect beea earlier in my 
possession. I indulged the lio.ie that on being made 
acquainted with the lacls here stated, he would have 
accorded to the Pennsylvania Reserves the meed of 
praise earned with the best blood or the State. This 
he has decUned or tailed to do; and I am reluctantly 
compelled, in justice to my brave associates, to make 
known their claims to their country's gratitude. My 
object is vindication and justice, not attack. The re- 
po.tsot General Heintzelman and others I have 
necessarily referred to, I take it lor granted were 
honestly made, though probably without as strict ex- 
amination ot the subject as should always mark the 
othcial reports ot mi itary commanders. They have 
proved their galiaLiiry in the fie.d, and I e:itertain 
no unkindly feelings towards them; their errors I 
have been forced to expose. 

George A. McCall. 
Belair, October 22, 1862 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




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HoIIinger 

pH8.5 

Mill Run F3-1955 



